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Abstract
This paper discusses the “positivistic” idea of the limits of law in various contexts: 
the conceptual problem of the “limits of law”, the limits of legal interpretation and 
the limits of theoretical disagreements in jurisprudence. In the latter case, we briefly 
show how contemporary “reflective” or “critical” positivist theories approach the 
possibility and limits of disagreements over the “grounds” of law. In what follows, 
we argue that these theories, which argue for a form of an “institutional” limit for 
admissible “legal” reasons as built upon theories of basic concepts or normative the-
ories of interpretation, are themselves actually underdetermined by “legal culture” 
or, so to speak, a “folk theory of law”. In the final section, we outline how a folk the-
ory of law constrains both conceptual and interpretive enterprises in jurisprudence.
Keywords Limits of law · Limited domain of law · Limits of legal interpretation · 
Platitudes · Folk theory of law · Theoretical disagreements
1  Limits of law
The question “what are the limits of law?” is ambiguous. The first basic interpreta-
tion of the question pertains to political philosophy and refers to the scope of legal 
regulations. It is understood as a question regarding the scope of legal regulations 
that is morally justified. Does the law have moral legitimacy to regulate all spheres 
of social life or should there be certain spheres of life that should be exempt from 
legal regulations? This is a normative matter since the answer must be based on con-
siderations pertaining to the issues of individual freedom, collective values, etc. As 
such, this matter belongs to both political and moral philosophy.
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A second interpretation of the question refers to the practical ability of law to 
effectively regulate certain fields. Are there any areas of social life in which the law 
is not able to effectively influence human behaviour and in which, therefore, any 
attempted regulations prove to be ineffective? The answer to this question must be 
based on sociological and psychological knowledge related to human motivation and 
regularities in the decision-making process. Such knowledge should be empirically 
justified. The question of the limits of law in this meaning pertains to the spheres of 
sociology and psychology of law.
A third interpretation refers to the scope of legal authority and/or legal power. 
This relates to the idea that law provides limitations for authorities and lawmakers; 
the idea of the rule of law along with the requirement that legal decisions should not 
be arbitrary. As stressed in many approaches to law [e.g., Kantian; see [24: 55–58]], 
the main problem of the limits of law is that not all coercion in the name of law can 
be justifiable [56: 8; see also 8: 15].
A fourth interpretation of the question concerning the limits of law is related to 
law’s stability. As Tuori puts it, “if there is something immutable in the law, this 
something imposes limits on the mutable elements, and, consequently, on the com-
petence of the legislator” [56: 18]. Seen from this perspective, the immutable ele-
ments of law were stressed by various theories of law. Natural law theories deter-
mined the immutable and universal borderlines of the lawgiver’s will. Although, 
in general, legal positivism focused rather on the mutable and, thus, the contin-
gent nature of laws and legal orders, particular positivist theories provided us with 
certain universal and immutable characteristics of law and the nature of law. For 
Kelsen, such a universal element was embedded in the structure of legal cognition, 
in the invariant formal structure of the law and the basic concepts determining this 
structure, including the concept of Grundnorm [56: 21]. Hartian positivists referred 
to the invariant structure of all mature municipal legal systems as the system of first- 
and second-order rules, which accounted for the contingent evolving character of 
law.
In its fifth and most interesting meaning for us today the question of the limits 
of law is understood as a general question of delimitation or demarcation [29, 39]. 
Are there boundaries between law and morality or other social norms? Can law be 
defined or identified without recourse to morality? The fundamental divide within 
legal philosophy is organised around this kind of questions. The founder of con-
temporary legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart, famously argued that law and morality 
are different but related phenomena [20]. Adherents of various versions of natural 
law argue that law should be understood as a branch of morality. The core thesis of 
contemporary legal positivism is that law is a matter of social facts alone [see, for 
example, 52]. This thesis is denied by natural lawyers who argue that law is a matter 
of both social and moral facts. An even wider domain of legally relevant reasons is 
invoked by legal realists or critical legal theorists.1 This thesis, in turn, is questioned 
1 F. Schauer writes: “To these assembled theorists, schools, and perspectives, and thus to much of the 
pragmatic and instrumentalist core of twentieth-century American legal thought, legal cognition is 
largely unbounded, and so the basic motivation behind the concept of the rule of recognition turns out to 
be empirically false” [48: 1927].
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by legal positivists whose arguments are related to a “limits of law” thesis or “lim-
ited domain of law” thesis. The first thesis claims that “there is a test which distin-
guishes what is law from what is not” [39: 842]. The second claims that “in most 
advanced legal systems [there is] a substantial quantity of otherwise valid social 
norms, or otherwise valid sources of decision, that law refuses to accept” [48: 1915].
But even if one accepts the positivistic stance, the problem of demarcation does 
not disappear. Positivism is in the first instance a theory of legal validity. Rules are 
legally valid if they satisfy the criteria set out in the system’s rule of recognition. 
The rule of recognition is a social rule determined solely by certain social facts [2]. 
The controversial matter within the positivistic camp is whether the criteria of legal 
validity set out by the rule of recognition must be purely descriptive as hard positiv-
ists claim or whether those criteria may appeal to morality as soft positivists claim. 
Irrespective of this controversy, two other issues arise.
The first is that legal positivism as a conceptual theory of legal validity does not 
develop any specific theory of legal interpretation. Assuming that legal positivism 
is true, we are able, based on the criteria set out by the rule of recognition of a 
specific legal system, to determine the set of valid legal rules. But this does not yet 
determine how those rules should be interpreted and applied. Here a new question 
of delimitation or demarcation arises. Is legal interpretation always morally neutral 
or does it necessarily involve an appeal to morality? Raz, the most important adher-
ent of hard legal positivism, claims on the one hand that for conceptual reasons, the 
criteria of legal validity that are set out in the systemic rule of recognition cannot 
refer to morality while, on the other hand, he claims that legal interpretation fre-
quently involves moral elements. He famously distinguished “reasoning about the 
law” and “reasoning in accordance with (or according to) the law”.2 The outcome of 
the former is the conclusion identifying valid legal rules; the conclusion of the latter 
is a resolution of a practical legal question that has arisen before the law applying 
agency. The reasoning about the law does not involve any moral components while 
the reasoning in accordance with the law, in most cases, does involve recourse to 
morality. At first glance, this does not contradict the main tenet of legal positivism, 
as legal positivism is a theory of legal validity and not a theory of legal interpreta-
tion and the application of law. Legal positivism does not tell judges how to decide 
cases. But does this mean that legal positivism may totally ignore the problem of 
interpretation and as such does not impose any constraints on interpreters? We 
return to this question later.
The second problem for traditional positivism is that it cannot account for the 
phenomenon of genuine theoretical disagreements in legal practice. Even though the 
system of “positive” law is mostly conventionally established by means of human 
decisions, in any system there still may arise disagreements with respect to “the 
grounds of law” or, so to speak, with respect to admissible reasons justifying certain 
“legal” outputs (propositions about one’s rights or obligations). Following Dworkin, 
2 This Razian distinction can be framed in an even simpler way as a distinction between law and legal 
reasoning, where the decisions produced in the process of reasoning are never fully determined by law 
alone [42; 48: 1949].
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by “grounds of law” we mean the ultimate facts (social. moral or other) that make 
legal propositions true [8: 5].3 Lawyers, judges, parties to the dispute or even aca-
demics may disagree about what is the correct theory of legal validity (what counts 
as a ground of law. Theoretical meta-interpretive disagreements may analogously 
arise about what determines the correct theory of legal interpretation. These kinds 
of disagreements are, however, held within a certain sphere of underlying agreement 
with respect to what counts as an admissible argument. Thus, one may speak of the 
“limits of theoretical disagreements”. Since the intuition pertaining to the limits of 
law appears to be a major premise for legal positivists, it is no surprise that after rec-
ognising such disagreements as a serious challenge to a traditional positivist picture 
of law, new “reflective” legal positivists decided to accommodate them within the 
positivist vision of law. Thus, the idea that “law has its limits” has been superseded 
by the idea that there are certain, mostly institutional limits imposed on the reason-
able discussions about what law is and how we should interpret it.
Since the problem of the limits of interpretation appears more tangible from a 
practitioner’s perspective, we elaborate on that first. Then, in the third section, we 
turn to the more general problem of the limits of theoretical disagreements.
2  Limits of Legal Interpretation
What are the limits of legal interpretation? Let us assume for the purpose of discus-
sion that a specific rule has been assessed based on the rule of recognition as a valid 
legal rule. The question arises whether this rule is applicable to a specific case under 
consideration. To answer this question, the rule must be interpreted. The interpreta-
tion of law sometimes consists of complex reasoning in which recourse is made to 
various reasons. It appears beyond any doubt that the scope of reasons that may be 
involved in this reasoning is limited. Not all possible reasons may be invoked as 
legal reasons, the use of which is permissible in the interpretation of law. We have 
here in mind justificatory reasons and not motivational reasons. We are interested in 
a normative question of how legal rules should be interpreted and not in a psycho-
logical question regarding what motivates judges and other legal officers to interpret 
legal rules in a particular way.
But why is the limiting of interpretative reasons necessary? If there were no lim-
its to legal interpretation, then the use of any reasons would be allowed. Therefore, 
there would be no limits for judicial discretion, and judicial decisions would be fully 
unpredictable. This would mean that law is not able to fulfil its major function of the 
protection of expectations. Thus, the idea of limits of interpretation appears to be 
essentially related to the idea of rule of law.
3 This formulation does not determine ultimately whether these “grounds” have to exist previously and 
independently of the application of any legal interpretive method (as at some point the reading of Dwor-
kin’s early work Taking Rights Seriously [7] might suggest) or whether the existence and content of these 
“grounds” are always partially dependent on certain interpretive activities (for even at “pre-interpretive 
stage” where such grounds are identified and where the minimum of interpretation is invoked, as later 
Dworkin suggests [8]).
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This point is made quite explicit from a slightly different perspective by Raz. Let 
us imagine a purely discretionary system in which judges have no duty to apply any 
pre-existing rules or precedents, but they are subject to a single instruction: they 
should make the decision they think best on the basis of all valid reasons [41: 138]. 
Pursuant to Raz, such a purely discretionary system cannot be called “law” as such a 
system would not have a guiding function for citizens and, therefore, no expectations 
as to the judge’s decision would be possible. Law must necessarily consist of rules 
the courts are bound to apply regardless of the view of their merit [41: 138]. The 
judicial duty to apply pre-existing rules is crucial for any legal system; citizens look 
to those rules for guidance and they expect them to be reinforced by judges.
We consider the protection of expectations the most important function ascribed 
to law by the folk theory of law.4 It is our view, one which we have defended else-
where [11, 12, 15] and to which we will return to in the second part of this paper, 
that each legal theory strives to rationally reconstruct the folk theory of law com-
posed of certain truisms or platitudes that are generally accepted by the folk. Law is 
a social artifact constituted by collective beliefs. In the absence of such beliefs (per-
ceived as platitudes about law), law does not exist. Therefore, no legal theory and no 
theory of legal interpretation can ignore commonly accepted beliefs although it may 
be a matter of controversy which beliefs are commonly accepted and which of them 
are platitudinous.
Therefore, the protection of expectations is the basic function of law and must be 
considered by each legal theory even if such a theory declares its descriptive nature 
as legal positivism does. Of course, this value must sometimes be balanced against 
other values such as justice, efficacy, etc., with respect to a particular case, but it 
must be always taken into account in resolving cases.
If that is true, the scope of admissible reasons in legal interpretation must be 
somehow restricted. If all thinkable justificatory reasons were admissible, then 
there would be no protection of expectations. The wording of legal rules would not 
restrict judicial decisions and any decisions based on any reasons whatsoever would 
be possible.
One further matter must be explained. What we have in mind are admissible or 
permissible reasons and not prevailing or decisive reasons. We need to discriminate 
between such reasons that are admissible for justification of an interpretative deci-
sion -admissible reasons- and such reasons that are excluded or prohibited -inad-
missible reasons. Among admissible reasons, there might be such that for a given 
case they are not applicable or are even wrong and, therefore, must be eliminated in 
favour of other reasons. In any case, such reasons must be argued against, defeated 
and rejected and cannot be simply ignored. The rejection of reasons that are inad-
missible does not require counter-argumentation; they should be simply ignored.
4 Raz denies that law has any central function [43]. Postema argues that Raz’s theory implies that law 
has a central function of supplying a framework of practical reasoning designed to unify public politi-
cal judgement and coordinate social interaction [38: 80]. We think that such a function (or a cluster of 
functions) is strictly connected with the idea of protection of expectations (and as such related to general 
requirements of the rule of law).
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We shall call reasons that are admissible in the interpretation of law “legal rea-
sons”. The claim that justificatory reasons in the interpretation of law must belong 
to the set of legal reasons does not imply any specific borderline between law and 
morality. Legal reasons in the meaning defined above may belong to various areas; 
they may be semantic, economic, moral or prudential among other reasons. We 
claim only that the scope of legal reasons is restricted in the sense that not all con-
ceivable reasons belong to the set of legal reasons.5 Therefore, the question of the 
limits of legal interpretation cannot be identified with the question of demarcation 
between law and morality; moral reasons may appear on both sides of the demarca-
tion line.
The interpretation of law is notoriously controversial. So called “hard cases” fre-
quently arise. For the sake of brevity, let us adopt a simple model of interpretation. 
This model assumes that legal interpretation is guided by rules of interpretation. 
Obviously, this does not mean that judges and other legal officials always follow the 
rules in the heuresis of interpretation, but only that they refer to rules of interpreta-
tion when justifying their decisions. In the model elaborated by Wróblewski, two 
levels of rules were distinguished [61: 74; 62: 91]. At the first level, a distinction is 
made between linguistic, systematic and functional or teleological rules. The sec-
ond-level rules resolve conflicts between those first-level rules. The role of the rules 
of interpretation is to determine the admissible reasons for interpretative decision.
In each legal culture, several normative theories or doctrines of interpretation 
exist [60: 143; 62: 61–72]. A normative theory of interpretation is composed of a 
certain number of first-level and second-level rules of interpretation which provide, 
in principle, a solution for every interpretative problem. As it appears, there are two 
types of controversy between various normative theories of interpretation. The first 
relates to the very legitimacy of certain first-level rules. For example, textualists 
deny the legitimacy of teleological rules or even the legitimacy of rules referring 
to the intention of the legislator [47: 16]. The legitimacy of such rules and, there-
fore, interpretative reasons based on such rules is denied in abstracto. They simply 
should never be applied. The second type of controversy relates to the priority of 
specific first-order rules. If there is a conflict between, for example, a linguistic rule 
and a teleological rule, which should have priority?
The first type of controversy is characteristic of common law legal culture (at 
least for American). Most discussions between supporters of conflicting views are 
of an axiological nature and relate directly to the legitimacy of first-level rules, 
not to ways of resolving conflicts between those rules. At stake is the existence or 
absence of the proper axiological justification of various first-level rules. Rules 
that are considered in abstracto as lacking in axiological justification should be 
abandoned. The consequence of such an approach is that no conflict between 
various rules would arise. For example, purposive rules are rejected in abstracto 
5 In the case of Dworkin’s interpretive theory, we might say that the scope of legal reasons is vast (judge 
Hercules is supposed to not exclude any of them a limine). Nonetheless, some conceivable reasons are 
excluded, such as reasons related to certain policies, as long as they are not somehow implicated in ques-
tions about rights [8, cf. 45: 1230].
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by adherents of formalism while rules referring to the intention of a drafter of 
the constitution are rejected by supporters of the original meaning rule. The pro-
ponents of the respective positions maintain that certain rules should never be 
applied. For this reason, a formalist, for example, would find no conflict between 
the purposive rule and the plain meaning rule because the former would not be 
considered. If this is the case, there is no need to introduce the theoretical con-
struction of second-level rules of interpretation.
The second type of controversy is common in continental legal cultures. In 
those cultures, the general legitimacy of various types of first-level rule (lin-
guistic, systematic, teleological) is not denied. For example, no one denies the 
rule that the prescribed legal definition of a word should be followed or that if 
the same word or phrase occurs more than once in the same legal text, the same 
meaning should be ascribed to each occurrence. Similarly, the rules that the 
structure of a legal text should be considered in the process of interpretation, or 
that a statute should be interpreted in accordance with its purpose, are not chal-
lenged. Difficulties occur when the application of one first-level rule leads to the 
ascription of different meaning to the same statute compared with the application 
of another rule. In such a situation, the first-level rules remain in conflict. The 
existence of such a conflict cannot be identified in abstracto. For example, there 
is no logical inconsistency between the first-level rules of linguistic and teleologi-
cal interpretation. They simply indicate different facts or circumstances as rea-
sons for an interpretative decision. A conflict between such reasons only develops 
in concreto. The application of a rule of linguistic interpretation—that the plain 
meaning of the legal text should be followed—may in concreto be in conflict with 
the application of a rule of teleological interpretation and requires that the inter-
pretation should accomplish the purpose of the statute. If such a conflict arises, it 
should be resolved by the application of second-level rules of interpretation [16] 
that determine (i) the sequence in which the first-level rules are to be applied and 
(ii) the priority relation between them in case of conflict.
The problem with second-level rules is twofold. First, there are no second-level 
rules that would be unconditionally and generally accepted. Second, even individual 
judges do not apply second-level rules in a consistent manner. For example, a judge 
might sometimes give priority to the rules of teleological interpretation and some-
times to the plain meaning rule. Usually, the justification of such a decision does 
not refer to any particular “ready-made” second-level rule. Such a reference is not 
ordinarily deemed to be a sufficient reason for an interpretative decision due to the 
highly controversial nature of second-level rules, since various normative theories 
of interpretation adopt different second-level rules. A proper justification requires 
direct reference to the values underlying the conflicting first-level rules.
Apparently, even if the first-level rules are conventionally accepted tools of legal 
interpretation, there is no such conventional acceptance with respect to normative 
theories of interpretation that provide us with the second-order rules of interpreta-
tion. This leaves us with an inevitable disagreement over: (i) which theories are in 
general admissible in the interpretive discourse and (ii) which theories among these 
are particularly well suited to the interpretive tasks at hand in any given case. This is 
the problem with meta-interpretive theoretical disagreements. One may ask what the 
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limits are regarding this and other kinds of theoretical disagreement in law. We turn 
to this question now.
3  Limits of Theoretical Disagreements
The question of the limits of law or its interpretation is thus a question of which 
kinds of reason are admissible in legal discourse—either in general or in the context 
of the application and interpretation of law. Schauer rightly identifies the problem 
of the limits of law as one of the essential problems of general jurisprudence [48]. 
Schauer analyses the “limited domain thesis”, namely:
the proposition that there are in most advanced legal systems a substantial 
quantity of otherwise valid social norms, or otherwise valid sources of deci-
sion, that law refuses to accept. If law is a limited decisional domain, argu-
ments permissible in other and larger domains become impermissible in law. 
[48: 1914–15]
Schauer does not take the question about the limited domain of law to be a merely 
conceptual question. He also opposes narrowing the idea of such a domain to the 
domain of norms and arguments. He writes that “the limited domain hypothesis is 
about the full range of decisional inputs, and not just about norms, rules, or argu-
ments” [48: 1917]. This approach appears to be correct,for in our terms “decisional 
inputs” are simply “reasons”. Note, however, that one may have many reasons to see 
something as a legal norm, obligation, duty, etc. There are many kinds of reasons 
that may be embedded in legal practitioners’ “webs of belief”. Some of these rea-
sons are conceptual, some are empirical or factual and some are descriptive whereas 
some are normative. The basic question law is supposed to resolve is practical—
what one ought to do—and the decision about concrete legal obligation may be jus-
tified by reference to such reasons. In that context, the idea that law is a limited 
domain allows for the restriction of the scope of considerations and related reasons 
that will influence “legal” judgments and decisions.
With all-things-considered decision making as the baseline, the limited 
domain hypothesis posits that an appreciably large number of considerations 
that might be available in all-things-considered decisional domains are una-
vailable to law. [48: 1930]
This idea appears to be closely related to an old idea that the main function of rules 
in general is to exclude time-consuming deliberation and provide subjects with clear 
directives as to how they ought to behave [41: 59]. Nonetheless, Schauer recognises 
that the differentiation between law and non-law—or to use his words, “the differ-
entiation of legal from other decisional domains”—need not only pertain to the dif-
ferentiation of decisional sources. As such, he recognises that apart from the con-
ceptual differentiation between various legal and non-legal kinds of sources, there 
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might be a kind of procedural differentiation pertaining to the decision-making 
mechanisms.6
Another means of differentiation appears to square with the general idea that 
identifying sources of law and interpreting them are two separate things. However, 
both means of differentiation—the differentiation of sources and the differentiation 
of procedures applied to these sources—are rooted in the very same idea. A judge, 
who, to use James’s phrase, “given previous law and a novel case […] twist[s] them 
into fresh law” [23: 116; cf. 57: 126] may justify his/her decision only by reference 
to reasons that are recognised as “legal reasons” in either a source-based or proce-
dure-based sense. One may differentiate between conceptual legal reasons, related 
inter alia to identifying and validating legal sources, and other types of procedural 
reason aimed at dealing with established sources. Interpretive reasons espoused with 
the idea of two types of rules of interpretation of law referred to above are a good 
example.
A serious challenge to the “limited domain thesis” in both versions, whether con-
ceptual, as related to sources, or procedural, as related to the process of interpreta-
tion, is that there is no general agreement between legal scholars and legal practi-
tioners as to the scope of admissible reasons. It is one thing to agree that law must 
have boundaries of some sort; it is quite another to agree what these boundaries are. 
The answer to this question is a matter of philosophic-institutional controversy. Such 
controversies may arise everywhere in any jurisdiction, since they have a common 
root: a folk “theory” of law that comprises of various types of platitudes about law 
and institutions; we return to this issue below. The folk intuition that law has limits 
has always been a central platitude underlying any positivist approach to law even 
though it contradicted another trivial idea, namely that law is an essentially discur-
sive, argumentative and thus agonistic practice [36].
Dworkin referred also mostly to the intuition that law has limits when he elab-
orated on the idea of “theoretical disagreement” in law. His distinction between 
empirical and theoretical disagreements serves nowadays as a basic departure point 
for many general jurisprudential enterprises. “Empirical” disputes arise when judges 
agree on the grounds of law but disagree over whether those grounds are satisfied in 
a specific case.7 However, one may worder how such grounds are selected and jus-
tified in the first place. Dworkin famously argued that “theoretical” disagreements 
regarding the proper selection of the “grounds of law”8 are a central feature of a 
legal practice [8, cf. 27: 1220]. Theoretical disagreements are commonly treated as a 
6 “The domain of legal sources might be coextensive with the domain of social sources, for example, but 
the legal system could still use those sources differently” [48: 1932]. Further, Schauer develops the idea 
in the following way: “Because applying different procedures to the same inputs would produce different 
results for some decisions—insofar as the array of results produced by the same sources with one pro-
cedure would be noncongruent with the array produced by another procedure—legal procedures would 
make a difference even if legal sources were not different” [id.].
7 Empirical disputes arise when judges agree on the grounds of law but disagree over whether those 
grounds are satisfied in a particular case [8: 5].
8 Theoretical disagreements are about the grounds of law and revolve over such questions as: what facts 
have to obtain in order for X to be law; what makes legal propositions true [8: 5].
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real phenomenon—only their scope is questioned. Hartian positivists used to argue 
that as a conceptual matter such disagreements were not to be considered relevant to 
the understanding of the nature of law, which was supposed to be thoroughly con-
ventional [51]), or they argued that the number of such disagreements was insig-
nificant. They appear only in the narrow minority of cases, in the highest courts—as 
Leiter puts it, on “the pinnacle of the pyramid”. Leiter claims that “theoretical disa-
greements about law represent only a miniscule fraction of all judgments rendered 
about law, since most judgments about law involve agreement, not disagreement” 
[27: 1226]. However, such a thesis is more an empirical thesis than a conceptual 
one.
Moreover, a distinction has been introduced between various types of theoreti-
cal disagreement. D. Smith argues that one should differentiate between theoretical 
disagreements about shallower grounds of law and theoretical disagreements about 
deeper grounds of law [53: 461–462). The shallower type of disagreement concern 
either (i) the criteria for ascertaining the sources of law in a given legal system or 
(ii) the ways in which these sources determine legal decisions; the deeper type of 
disagreements concern either (iii) what determines the very sources of law or (iv) 
what determines the ways in which sources of law determine legal decisions. Note 
that types (i) and (iii) are disagreements over the concept of law, or at least different 
“legislative theories” or theories of legal validity, whereas (ii) and (iv) are meta-
interpretive disagreements over methods of interpretation.
Only recently have positivists agreed that the phenomenon of theoretical disa-
greement poses a serious challenge to the traditional positivist picture of law [11, 17, 
18, 51–53]. Dworkin’s claim that theoretical disagreements are the most important 
feature of legal practice is the consequence of his holistic and pragmatic approach 
[9: 160]. The central role that such disagreements play is also related to their phil-
osophic-practical dimension.9 The Dworkinean approach to disagreements is, how-
ever, somehow paradoxical, as the mere existence of such disagreements, which are 
for him genuine disagreements, may suggest that law has no limits, or at least the 
limits of law are as widely sketched as the reach of these disagreements. To restrict 
the scope of the law, Dworkin reaches for specific interpretive methods. This posi-
tion may be understood as paradoxical. One cannot take theoretical disagreements 
seriously (which amounts to taking disagreeing parties as epistemic peers, that is 
as equally reasonable parties who use equally good arguments) and simultaneously 
argue for one right position in every disagreement. That is what Dworkin does by 
introducing his interpretive theory and simultaneously demoting legal positivism as 
an unreliable theory of law [cf. 10, 11]).
Contemporary legal positivists try to accommodate the phenomenon of theoreti-
cal disagreements by showing that the positivist institutional scaffolding may play 
9 Recall his famous statement: “Any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited, 
assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations compete, a 
legal argument assumes one and rejects others. So, any judge’s opinion is itself a piece of legal philoso-
phy even when the philosophy is hidden, and the visible argument is dominated by citation and lists of 
facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of the adjudication silent prologue to any decision at law” [8: 90].
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the role of a frame of reference to such disagreements. All these considerations aim 
to deal with the phenomenon within certain limits and without arguing for one right 
position in these disagreements. Such versions of legal positivism appear to take a 
“meta-theoretical” step. They do not urge one conceptual theory of legal sources or 
one right interpretive stance. Rather, they try to reflectively posit this inevitably ago-
nistic legal element [37] within the structure of institutional reality.
“Reflective versions of positivism” still conceive law’s existence as dependent on 
the consistent practice of officials. However, they approach that practice differently 
than classical Hartian positivism. On the one hand, such theories are more abstract 
and inclusive than Hartian positivism on the “subject-level”, which pertains mainly 
to the identification of the content of the concept of law.10 On the other hand, such 
theories that try to “take theoretical disagreements seriously” must embrace a meta-
theoretical perspective, taking a stance on the status of the argument between dif-
ferent legal theories, or concepts of law. Thus, “reflective legal positivism” operates 
at two levels: the subject level of understanding and explaining the coherent prac-
tice of officials and the meta-theoretical level of discussing the controversy between 
different, also non-positivist, subject-level theories. The crucial question is whether 
positivist theories that make such a move up the theoretical ladder do not betray 
their basic subject-level assumptions. Obviously, the proponents of this approach 
must decline, at least tacitly, the distinction between theory and meta-theory; this is 
what makes their theories “holistic” and, thus, similar in some extent to Dworkin’s 
approach. However, they remain positivist, as they focus on limiting the scope of 
theoretical disagreements by reference to a refurbished positivist “social thesis”.
Three examples of such recent “reflective positivist theories” come to mind. 
Since we do not have space here to discuss them thoroughly, we limit ourselves to 
the presentation of their most important features. The first is Shapiro’s theory of 
planning, which sees the legal system as a wide complicated social plan, the realisa-
tion of which is a joint commitment of planners and agents. The second is Golan-
ski’s institutional account of theoretical disagreements as disagreements held within 
the “institutional structure of law”. The third is Tuori’s “critical legal positivism”. 
Let us elaborate on them briefly.
In Shapiro’s view, “theoretical disagreements” are understood as disagree-
ments between various interpretive methodologies. Plans determine the structure 
for many types of social interactions, but they do not determine them completely. 
Rather, plans are sometimes more general and sometimes more detailed and spe-
cific. Moreover, plans do not necessarily determine legal outcomes. An important 
element of this theory is the relation between various interpretive methodologies 
and the way one should choose between them. At this point, Shapiro’s positiv-
ism makes a “meta-theoretical step”. Plans allow for a certain distribution of 
trust between agents. Planners who trust more in the reflective abilities of agents 
leave them more discretion and allow them to apply more demanding interpretive 
10 The subject-level differences are the differences between the theories of the same kind addressing 
similar questions and problems like, for example, the question of the grounds of law as related to law’s 
sources.
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methodologies (like, for example, the Dworkinian one). Where, however, the 
scope of trust is limited, the plans are more detailed, and the interpretive method-
ology should be less reflective and less demanding. It appears that, in Shapiro’s 
view, the right way to resolve any theoretical disagreement—which is understood 
as a disagreement between interpretive methodologies—is to analyse the institu-
tional structure of plans to see the actual division of trust within the system [52: 
313].
The second theory by Golanski is a “legal” specification of Searle’s institutional 
theory. It claims that there are two ways of understanding “theoretical disagree-
ment”. According to the narrow view, the disagreement is about which methodol-
ogy of interpretation should be applied to legal materials in particular circumstances 
(originalism, evolutionism, intentionalism, consequentialism, etc.). This may be 
consistent with Shapiro’s approach. According to the wide view pursued by Dwor-
kin, theoretical disagreements are understood as disagreements over the soundest 
interpretation of a certain aspect of legal practice [8: 87; cf. 17: 24]. Golanski claims 
that contemporary institutional philosophy has produced analytic tools that allow us 
to differentiate between various types of theoretical disagreement, most of which 
do not have moral character. This is precisely that differentiation which makes this 
theory “positivistic”.
Golanski argues that:
[a]n understanding of the logic of institutional power and authority shows that 
‘theoretical’ disputes in law are, in the first instance, best understood as con-
troversies over the standards for determining whether the existing legal mate-
rials are sufficiently directed at the present circumstances, and whether they 
provide a solution to the new matter with sufficient exactness. [18: 229–230]
Although these kinds of disagreement relate to the relation of fit between existing 
legal materials and new contexts or situations, they are not necessarily moral disa-
greements because disagreeing parties do not necessarily aim at the moral justifica-
tion of that relation [18: 264]. As such, they belong to the (i) and (iii) types of disa-
greement described above.
Note that both theories provide a test for the “limits of theoretical disagreements 
in law”. Such a test could be interpreted as a test determining which theories of law 
and legal interpretation are admissible in legal discourse as in the case of Golanski’s 
theory, or which shall have priority in certain contexts as in the case of Shapiro’s 
theory. Note, however, that both theories appear to assume that there might be a set 
of various theories admissible in legal discourse—the set that would be delimited by 
institutional designers’ plans and arrangements.
The (Razian) thesis of the “limits of law”, namely that “there is a test which dis-
tinguishes what is law from what is not”, is now superseded by a “limit of theo-
retical disagreement” thesis according to which “there is a test which distinguishes 
what is an admissible legal theory or legal argument from what is not”. Even though 
this test works mostly with respect to meta-interpretive disagreements, namely disa-
greements related to the methods of interpretation, it may also be used to demarcate 
the acceptable general theories of law, i.e., of legal validity or of legal sources, from 
unacceptable ones.
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Finally, the third theory we want to refer to is “critical legal positivism” developed 
by Tuori. This theory provides us with a more general explanation of the admis-
sibility of certain types of reasons in legal discourse. Tuori argues that law should 
be understood as a multi-layered phenomenon where social practices are combined 
with normative thought [56].11 In this view, law is not exhausted by concrete legal 
materials such as, for example statutes, regulations and court decisions, but includes 
“sub-surface” layers: legal culture and deep structures of the law. Tuori’s reflection 
grows from the identification of the well-known problems with traditional forms of 
legal positivism:
[T]raditional positivism has to abandon either the strict separation between the 
‘Is’ of empirical social facts and the legal ‘Ought’ (Hart) or presuppose at the 
top of the hierarchically-structured posited legal order a non-positive, hypo-
thetical norm (Kelsen). [56: 27]
Tuori argues that any alternative to traditional forms of legal positivism “should 
be capable of providing a solution which does not include the assumption of uni-
versal and immutable normative  principles” (Tuori, id.) If we stick to the idea that 
modern law is “positive”, then this very idea “entails that the substantive limits of 
modern law, as well as the yardsticks for its legitimacy, have to be found within the 
positive law” [56: 28; cf. 35]. What is most important here is that the theory must 
embrace “the possibility of an immanent normative criticism of positive law” [56: 
28].12 Tuori’s critical version of positivism makes relevant the division between the 
descriptive social and normative layers of law by “emphasising the constant interac-
tion between the law as a symbolic normative phenomenon and the legal practices 
producing and reproducing this phenomenon”; this eventually leads to a dialectical 
revision of the positivist dogma, namely the separation (or separability) thesis. How-
ever, the main reason we take Tuori’s theory to be a theory about the positivist limits 
of theoretical disagreements is best captured by the following quotation:
Immanent criticism cannot expand to a fundamental criticism of the law. By 
‘fundamental criticism’ I refer to criticism which is suspicious of the justifi-
ability of all law and which tends to renounce every form of legal regulation of 
society. This kind of criticism is possible only from outside the law, as autono-
mous criticism which draws its grounds upon somewhere else than upon the 
positive law itself. Fundamental criticism is not possible as immanent criti-
cism for the simple reason that immanent criticism, despite its critical nature, 
also contributes to the reproduction of its object: it sustains the law both as a 
normative order and as specific legal practices. [56: 29]
12 “If we can define the limits and the criteria of validity of the law from within its positivity, we have 
demonstrated the possibility of an immanent legal criticism which employs inter-subjectively acceptable 
substantive criteria. […] In Kelsen’s view, a substantive normative criticism would require a moral posi-
tion outside the law” [56: 28].
11 The thesis that law is a multi-layered phenomenon has been discussed by many scholars, including J. 
Wróblewski. However, Tuori is inspired by the views of Ewald and Habermas [56: xiii].
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 One can see that in this dialectical and critical version of legal positivism, there 
must be a “postivistically” or “institutionally” imposed framework for theoretical 
disagreements as various forms of criticism may appear with respect to applied con-
cepts and interpretive methods. However, the criticism that “critical legal positiv-
ism” has in mind cannot be of a “fundamental” kind. Tuori argues that there are 
limits for such a criticism, which are determined by legal culture and law’s deep 
structure.13 Furthermore, an essential element of this structure appears to be a con-
viction that law is an institutionalised, “positivised” practice.
All these “reflective” positivist theories rely on certain important shared intui-
tions about law’s relation to morality, law’s positivity, and its “institutional” char-
acter as well as some general characteristics of legal culture. Hence, we would like 
to briefly discuss the general way in which various legal theories are admitted into 
legal discourse.
4  Folk Limitations of Law and Legal Disagreements
One assumes that any serious or genuine theoretical disagreement is a reasonable 
philosophical peer disagreement about what counts as law or about what methods of 
interpretation are both acceptable and most suitable either in general or in specific 
institutional circumstances. However, the question arises of what makes various tra-
ditional positivist and non-positivist positions equally admissible in the discourse. 
Our answer is that various theories may only occupy a legitimate position in theoret-
ical disagreements if they deal with the same or equal evidence by means of shared 
general scientific methodological standards.14 It is a fact that an evidential and pru-
dential equality exists between traditional legal positivists and non-positivists, and is 
recognised by both sides as epistemic peers. In the case of the dispute between posi-
tivists and non-positivists, there is only partial agreement over several sources of 
law. Positivists accept social sources as sufficient evidence; Dworkineans consider 
these insufficient. Moreover, positivists deem improper any additional theoretical 
evidence that their opponents invoke. Nonetheless, this does not preclude all parties 
from engaging into a reasonable discussion.
This suggests that to recognise the limits of theoretical disagreements, one first 
scrutinises the way in which they arise. There must be something all theorists 
share as a start. In our opinion, all significant general legal theories are products 
13 “We can perform the task of determining the law’s limits while respecting the positivity of modern 
law if we understand it as a multi-layered phenomenon where the surface level of the discursively for-
mulated legal order—of regulations, court decisions and scholarly standpoints—is sustained by the legal 
culture and the law’s deep structure […] [T]he deeper layers of the law create the possibility for legal 
practices and the surface-level normative material these produce. But at the same time, the sub-surface 
levels of the legal culture and the deep structure also impose limitations on this material. Limitation is 
the inseparable obverse side of constitution” [56: 217].
14 We take this requirement to be very general indeed, to the extent it allows for far reaching methodo-
logical debates over proper method in general jurisprudence.
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of analyses of the concept of law and as such are dependent upon shared folk 
theories of law. Raz expressed this idea in the following way:
The notion of law as designating a type of social institution is not, however, 
part of the scholarly apparatus of any learned discipline. It is not a concept 
introduced by academics to help with explaining some social phenomena. 
Rather it is a concept entrenched in our society’s self-understanding. It is 
a common concept in our society and one which is not a preserve of any 
specialized discipline […]. It occupies a central role in our understanding 
of society, our own as well other societies. In large measure what we study 
when we study the nature of law is the nature of our self-understanding 
[…]. It is part of our self-consciousness of the way we conceive and under-
stand our society […]. That consciousness is part of what we study when we 
inquire into the nature of law. [43: 31]
There is no doubt that the traditional positivistic thesis of the “limits of law” dis-
cussed above represents a platitude that people living in municipal legal systems 
generally share. For example, Raz explicitly states that the claim that “law has 
limits” is “truistic” [40]. There are also other kinds of platitudes pertaining to 
other features of a legal system. In his magisterial book, Hart wrote: “The start-
ing point for this clarificatory task is the widespread common knowledge of the 
salient features of a modern municipal legal system which… I attribute to any 
educated man” [20: 239–240].
Thus, it appears that this traditional form of legal positivism relies on plati-
tudes about law. Folk intuitions embedded in platitudes constitute the common 
“understanding” of law and provide an ultimate criterion for determining limits 
of the concept of law. It would follow that folk theory “genetically” delimits the 
scope of possible theories of law.
Tuori even provides an elaborate description of how “positivist” theories of 
law depend on such shared “understanding”:
The positivity of modern law corresponds—so I venture to maintain—
to how a typical (continental European) lawyer conceives of the law. (…) 
[This] formalistic narrative corresponds to the average self-understanding of 
(continental European) lawyers, although they may only rarely feel a need 
to make it explicit. Rather, it constitutes a part of what—following Pierre 
Bourdieu—can be termed their habitus; it is this very habitus that enables 
them to act as lawyers, as agents in specific legal practices. [56: 7]
And then he admits that,
[t]he account of the law attributed here to the typical lawyer represents a 
kind of spontaneous positivism. Positivistic legal theory can be understood 
as the reflexive level of this spontaneous positivism: positivistic theory has 
given an explicit and systematic expression to the self-understanding of the 
typical lawyer. [id.]
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What is worth stressing is that even early representatives of conceptual legal dog-
matism such as Puchta or Savigny argued that positive law was not yet exhausted by 
legislative sources. In this view, sources of positive law also included legal convic-
tions of the people and the so-called scientific or lawyers’ law; the people’s legal 
convictions amounting to “the Volksgeist” stood as a more fundamental layer than 
legislation and the lawyers’ law [58; via 56: 152]. Most of this layer was filled with 
rather practical knowledge. What is however important is that,
in modern society, knowledge about the legal culture can in principle be 
expressed discursively, transformed from practical into discursive knowledge. 
This is what is done by legal scholars within theoretical legal dogmatics or by 
judges when justifying the decisions in hard cases. Conforming to the reflexiv-
ity of modern culture, the borderline between practical and discursive knowl-
edge in the consciousness of legal actors is blurred. Yet in exploring the multi-
layered nature of modern law, it is important not to confuse the legal culture 
with its surface level discursive expressions. [56: 163]
The point is, however, that legal professionals have internalised these elements as 
part of their practical consciousness; they usually employ them in legal practices in 
at least a partly unconscious way. Thus, as Tuori notes any suggestion that there is a 
deeper structure of the law underlying the legal culture may be surprising for them 
[56: 184]. However, he also observes that:
the reflexivity of modern culture makes it possible to transform even practical 
knowledge about the deep structure into a discursive shape. This is attested to 
by the legal philosophical literature aiming at reconstructing the deep struc-
ture. But knowledge about the deep structure of the law constitutes in the con-
sciousness of legal actors the most fundamental, deepest sedimented layer, 
whose excavation and discursive formulation is a more demanding task than 
the articulation of the legal culture. In this respect, the law’s deep structure 
comes close to what the Freudian psychoanalytical theory, at the level of indi-
viduals, calls the subconscious. [56: 184]
This reflectivity squares with the idea of “internal criticism” discussed above. As far 
as the same practices may receive different but competing discursive articulations, 
we may speak of genuine theoretical disagreements in legal discourse.
However, one is not forced to accept Tuori’s methodological approach, which 
relies on critical post-Marxist and post-Freudian trends in philosophy. What is 
referred to here as a “subconscious” level of shared understanding squares with what 
is referred to by analytic philosophers under the name of “folk theory”, “ordinary 
conception”, or “shared/common beliefs” [22, 30, 31]. Thus, Tuori’s point may be 
reformulated as a claim that what determines legal culture, along with all conceptual 
and normative arguments, is a folk theory of law. At the beginning of Legality, Sha-
piro provides the following description of this methodological approach relying on 
Jackson’s conception of the method of conceptual analysis:
Conceptual analysis can easily be thought of as a kind of detective work. 
Imagine that someone is murdered. The detective will first look for evidence 
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at the crime scene, collecting as many clues as she can. She will study those 
clues hoping that the evidence, coupled with her knowledge of the world 
and human psychology, will help eliminate many of the suspects and lead 
her to the identity of the killer. In conceptual analysis, the philosopher also 
collects clues and uses the process of elimination for a specific purpose, 
namely to elucidate the identity of the entity that falls under the concept 
in question. The major difference between the philosopher and the police 
detective is that the evidence that the latter collects and analyses concerns 
true states of affairs whereas the former is primarily interested in truistic 
ones. [52: 13]
As suggested above, the folk theory in general would be embedded in ordinary com-
mon sense. It need not be specified fully and explicitly, and indeed it usually is not. 
Any discursive theory of an object or phenomena referred to in folk consciousness 
would be construed by means of conceptual analysis of folk beliefs. Such an analysis 
is an armchair attempt to locate the meaning of the terms used in the folk theory in 
the terms of another by means of testing intuition against possible cases; therefore, 
it is an exercise in a form of translation or paraphrasing. It is an attempt to locate 
the meaning of terms of folk theory in terms of a more sophisticated special theory 
rooted in a metaphysically privileged vocabulary (cf. 22).
Shapiro provides a preliminary list of platitudes of the folk theory of law:
The philosophical clues, in other words, are not merely true, but self- evidently 
so. The key to conceptual analysis, then, is the gathering of truisms about a 
given entity [52: 13].
Furthermore, regarding law, he continues:
[…] In assembling a list of truisms about law, the legal philosopher must 
include truisms about basic legal institutions (“All legal systems have judges,” 
“Courts interpret the law,” “One of the functions of courts is to resolve dis-
putes,” “Every legal system has institutions for changing the law”); legal 
norms (“Some laws are rules,” “Some laws impose obligations,” “Laws can 
apply to those who created them,” “Laws are always members of legal sys-
tems”); legal authority (“Legal authority is conferred by legal rules,” “Legal 
authorities have the power to obligate even when their judgments are wrong,” 
“In every legal system, some person or institution has supreme authority to 
make certain laws”); motivation (“Simply knowing that the law requires one 
to act in a certain way does not motivate one to act in that way,” “It is possible 
to obey the law even though one does not think that one is morally obligated 
to do so,” “One can be a legal official even though one is alienated from one’s 
job”); objectivity (“There are right answers to some legal questions,” “Courts 
sometimes make mistakes when interpreting the law,” “Some people know 
more about the law than others”) and so on. [52: 15]
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Note that, in a sense, these platitudes might relate to other generally shared claims 
about law associated to the general requirements of the rule of law.15 There is a 
widespread general agreement between legal theorists and laypeople that law should 
be general, non-retroactive, prospective, not vague, stable, etc. In a recent paper, Raz 
argues that any theory of the rule of law is an “ideal theory of law’s virtues”. How-
ever, he stresses:
There is no agreement about what it is: This lack of agreement is common to 
important normative institutions and principles, like freedom of speech. The 
lack of agreement is often a source of strength–people unite in supporting such 
institutions and principles in spite of diverse views about their nature. But 
should we not try to establish which of the views is correct? Often more than 
one is correct, the disagreement is illusory, an illusion resulting from the fact 
that the term ‘the rule of law’ is used to designate somewhat different ideals. 
There is no point in verbal disputes about which ideals deserve to be called the 
RoL [rule of law]. However, it may also be important to distinguish the differ-
ent ideals, as they are likely to differ in at least some of their implications. [44: 
1]
 Raz is right in saying that there are disagreements over the theoretical 
articulations of these values and requirements. But the reasonability of any disagree-
ment over these ideals would be dependent upon rooting these theories in common-
sense beliefs about law’s institutionalised and authoritative mode of operation and 
its ability to guide human conduct. The limits of theoretical disagreements in juris-
prudence are fixed by the same shared set of truisms of folk theory that delimit the 
scope of disagreements over law’s internal virtues. Different ideals may be associ-
ated with them and articulated in a theory. But, contrary to Raz, this does not mean 
that disagreement is illusory for it is still rooted in a shared practical yet not-articu-
lated understanding of law and its functions. That is what makes this disagreement 
reasonable even though there is no unique correct answer in the discussed matter. 
This caveat is important for our purposes for this is exactly why, even in the case of 
accepting a positivist theory of law that declares indifference with respect to admis-
sible theories of legal interpretation, there are obvious limits to legal interpretation 
and theoretical disagreement circumscribed by that shared understanding (which is, 
in turn, essentially related to a general and vague idea of the rule of law).
5  Artefactual Concept of Law and Its Analysis
It is worth remarking that there are two roles that a conceptual analysis may play: 
modest or immodest. As Himma, following Jackson [22] notes:
The goal is either to understand certain features of the world as they are 
defined and articulated through our conceptual practices or to understand those 
15 The striking variety of truisms invoked by Shapiro is discussed by Chiassoni [4: 154].
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features as they actually are independent of the practices that enable us to 
describe them. [21: 208]
Immodest conceptual analysis provides us with an insight into what the world is like 
independent of our linguistic practices and conceptual frameworks. It is an analysis 
of the content of our concept that yields truth about the essential characteristics of 
the referent [21: 208]. As a result, analysing the way we talk about, use and apply 
our concepts will yield knowledge not merely of those concepts themselves but also 
of what the world is like, i.e., of the reality those concepts attempt to conceptualize 
[28, cf. 6: 488].
However, the modest conceptual analysis is “the elucidation of the possible situ-
ations covered by the words we use to ask our questions” [22: 33]. It gives us an 
insight into what the world is like as defined by the ordinary understandings that 
underlie our linguistic and other relevant social practices; it illuminates our con-
cepts—our thoughts and speech—not the referent we might have intended to under-
stand. It does not pretend to give us access to mind-independent reality. The subject 
matter of our inquiry is the folk theory of items, covered by the concept to be ana-
lysed. The purpose of the analysis is to answer the question of how we comprehend 
the world, not the question of what the world is actually like. As such, this type of 
analysis will only deliver an understanding of our concepts and will be “ethnograph-
ically relative” [28]. As “an exercise in sophisticated conceptual ethnography” and 
“glorified lexicography”, such analyses cannot provide what some legal theorists are 
explicitly after, i.e., a description of the nature of law, of its essential properties.
This distinction has been applied to analyse the methodological approaches of 
most prominent representatives of general jurisprudence. For example, Himma 
argued that Dworkin deploys an immodest conceptual analysis whereas positivism 
deploys a modest conceptual analysis [21]. Farell suggested that Hart’s positivism 
deploys modest conceptual analysis [14: 1006; cf. 19: 577). Meanwhile, Leiter and 
Langlinais argued that most post-Hartian analytical jurisprudence (Hart, Raz, etc.) 
deploys immodest conceptual analysis [26: 671-689]; this position appears to also 
be accepted by Sciaraffa [49]. It is unclear, however, whether Shapiro [52] deploys 
analysis in modest or immodest form.16
All these examples show that a reference to a folk theory of law, platitudes about 
what law is, serve as the best available evidence for legal philosophers. The ques-
tion is, however, to what extent the results of an analysis (discursive articulations in 
Tuori’s terms) are really representative of a part of institutional reality and to what 
extent they merely reveal a discursive thought about something non-existent or fic-
tious. In what follows, we argue that the solution would depend on the selected, 
metaphysically privileged picture implied by the selected target vocabulary in the 
conceptual analysis. As we have suggested, reflective positivist theories rely on 
some version of institutional ontology, which in turn relies on some idea that places 
law and related concepts within the domain of “artefactuality” (artefact kinds). The 
16 For a well-argued critical view on conducting Canberra-style analysis in positivistic context see Spaak 
[54].
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target vocabulary of institutional ontology thus implies some sort of realism with 
respect to artefact kinds.
The main problem we try to deal with in the final part of the paper is thus the 
problem of how the idea of law as an artefact–institutional concept squares with the 
thesis that theoretical disagreements have limits. If the main problem we deal with 
is the problem of determining “a test which distinguishes what is an admissible legal 
theory or legal argument from what is not”, then we must be able to defend the view 
that there might be many equally good discursive articulations of folk’s platitudes, 
such as, for example, analyses and theories of the very same abstract institutional 
artefact, namely “law” and related practices. Our suggestion is that within certain 
limits provided by a folk theory of law, any analysis of an artefact concept such as 
the concept of law will be immodest in the sense that it would capture some essen-
tial characteristic of law and would thus square with the realist approach to artefact 
kinds.17 In other words, any analysis of the folk concept of law would yield some 
immodest results, since it is a folk theory of law that serves as a legitimate point of 
departure in legal theorising. In connection to this, a couple issues arise.
One interesting issue is a certain type of paradox related to legal theorising. This 
“paradox of legal theorising” would be a theoretical analogue of so called “paradox 
of analysis” indicated 75  years ago by Langford [25]. According to Langford, an 
analysis of certain supposedly analytical sentences can be either correct or informa-
tive, but it cannot be both. In the same vein, legal theories cannot be both trivial and 
informative since if they are trivial, they do not develop but merely repeat all the 
truisms about law, particularly the folk theory of law, and if they are informative, 
then they are inherently controversial because they treat some of the truisms as false, 
or, at least, reinterpret them in a nonstandard way, as any discursive, coherent theo-
retical articulation would do. The question is, thus, how can a theory of law or legal 
interpretation be both informative and true?
Our sketchy way to answer this paradox is to argue that it might not be the very 
same proposition that must be true and informative. Thus, one may argue that legal 
theories refer to true folk propositions, the content of which is most probably not 
fully determined and provide detailed “reconstructions” of these propositions given 
a certain metaphysical framework. In this light, the problem of the limits of the-
oretical disagreements would be a problem of the underdetermination of a theory 
by folk evidence. Disagreeing theorists would refer to the same evidence, but they 
would analyse and interpret it differently.18 To vindicate the phenomenon of rational 
17 That this will yield further limitations with respect to the concept of legal interpretation and the idea 
of theoretical disagreements.
18 Another option is that theorists, in fact, refer to different but equally sustainable platitudes. However, 
the question is whether legal theorists could refer to a totally different body of evidence and still speak 
about the same thing. We doubt that. Another possibility is that there are in fact manifold concepts of 
law (pluralism)—these are concepts of law that may not have any common content. This view is usually 
related to some anti-essentialist theses (such as Tamanaha’s [55]). In such cases, there is evidential equal-
ity—parity between theorists and their concepts—but, is there really any disagreement? We would rather 
say that parties would speak one past another (as in the Dworkinian scenario of them being “semantically 
stung” [8: 44]).
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theoretical disagreement in law, one must assume that there is some truth of the 
matter that counts. The common content of the concept might be minimal, however. 
That is why we think it necessary to accept some kind of minimalist essentialism 
along the lines of, for example, Elder [13] within an artefactual theory of law and 
along the lines of Burazin [2, 3], Crowe [5] or Banaś [1]).
Moreover, we assume that any theory that treats law (or a system of law as a kind 
of mind-independent institution must treat law as an artifact.19 According to the arti-
factual theory of law:
legal systems are artifacts because they are created by authors (as a rule collec-
tive ones) having a particular intention to create the institutional artifact ‘legal 
system’ based on the authors’ substantive and substantively correct concept of 
what the legal system is under the condition that this intention be largely suc-
cessfully realised. The intention required here is, of course, not an individual 
intention or a sum of individual intentions but the result of collective inten-
tionality. By being institutional by nature, institutional artifacts differ from 
‘ordinary’ artifacts (such as chairs, hammers or clocks) in that they are rule-
based and require collective recognition (acceptance). [2: 68; cf. 3: 112–135]
This kind of theory relies on a “function-concept of an artifact” where the general 
intention required to successfully create an artifact is the intention to make a thing 
that corresponds to a list of salient functional features that systematically complies 
with the concept of that thing [5: 741]. X is a social institutional artefact of kind K 
(e.g., law) if (a) members of a social group have in mind a function-concept of K 
that includes both its characteristic function and a range of other salient features, 
and (b) the item in question is collectively accepted as largely complying with that 
concept [5: 741], it follows that any given social group must have an appropriate 
concept of K to create a social artefact of the kind K.20 Such a pre-conception under-
lying a given practice, i.e., a folk theory developed around an artifact, may consist of 
both descriptive and normative beliefs about it.
What we want to argue for squares with a suggestion made by Williams [59] in 
his discussion of the essential determination of artefactual functions. He suggests 
that any practical claim about the “goodness” of an artefact, e.g., “a good law”, 
invokes the problem of evaluation within theoretical disagreements about that arte-
fact. Williams notes:
[T]he meaning of a phrase of the form ‘a good x’ has to be taken as a whole; 
and its meaning is partly determined by what fills the place of ‘x’. Can we go 
further than this and say that in phrases of this form, the meaning of the whole 
is essentially determined by the meaning of what takes the place of “x”? […] 
In many cases, it looks as though we might take this further step. For if we 
consider functional descriptions of artefacts, such as ‘clock’ or ‘tin opener’, or 
19 We mean here mind-independence in the weak sense. An object is mind independent in the weak 
sense if its existence does not depend on the beliefs of any particular person but depends on shared col-
lective beliefs.
20 Artifactual theory of law draws on Searle’s account of institutions [50].
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again descriptions of human beings which refer to their roles or jobs or skilled 
activities, such as ‘gardener’ or ‘general’ or ‘cricketer’ it does seem that if one 
understands these expressions (at least in the strong sense that one understands 
what a tin opener is, for instance, or what a general does), then one has under-
standing, within limits, of what a good thing of that sort is. [59: 45]
The practical discourse consists mostly of such evaluative claims. Legal education 
is partly about learning what counts as a “good” legal argument and what does not. 
The idea of law being an artifactual type must, therefore, be supplemented with the 
idea of at least a partly “institutionalised” legal culture (education, etc.) based on a 
more fundamental “understanding” of law that provides limits for various kinds of 
arguments, including evaluative ones, related to law. What vindicates the theoretical 
evaluative discourse about law is a shared understanding of what a good law is. Our 
suggestion in this context is that there must be a specific foundational folk theory 
which would amount to a set of platitudes necessary for a group to share collective 
intentions and beliefs that are able to successfully create an institutional artefact of 
a certain kind K in the first place. Such platitudes would be mostly of the functional 
kind, that is, pertaining to an idea, however vague, of what functions law is sup-
posed to fulfil and, thus, included in the commonly shared platitudes about law’s 
virtues.21 This set of platitudes embedded in a common understanding of law could 
not be false in that it would be true that any instance of law should possess certain 
characteristics to perform its essential functions. The inevitable link between norma-
tive intuitions about law and the content of the concept of law cannot be denied.22 
Such platitudes would obviously be supplemented by other sets of platitudes, some 
of which could be false. For example, people used to hold a distorted view on a 
God-related authority of law. However, this foundational, essential and interlinked 
set of platitudes—both normative and descriptive must be shared across legal cul-
tures and jurisdictions otherwise such an enterprise as general jurisprudence would 
not be possible. So, one should distinguish between a general folk theory that com-
prises generally shared platitudes about law that cannot be false and that play the 
role of a necessary reference point for any theory of law and a possible remaining 
part of folk theory that would be culturally relative and contingent, and thus vindi-
cating particular jurisprudential efforts.
21 We think here of the implicit awareness of the function of the kind as having a certain status—perhaps 
knowledge of the “success conditions”, i.e., the conditions pertaining to a particular type of thing that 
may count as an artifact; people should be generally aware of those conditions—somebody who intends 
to create a K but produces the wrong kind of thing to be K ends up with something that is not K.
22 Raz famously argues against conceptual dependence between the concept of law and the ideal of the 
rule of law: “Clearly, the extent to which generality, clarity, prospectivity, etc. are essential to the law is 
minimal and is consistent with gross violations of the rule of law. But are not considerations of the kind 
mentioned sufficient to establish that there is necessarily at least some moral value in every legal system? 
I think not. The rule of law is essentially a negative value (…) conformity to it does not cause good 
except through avoiding evil and the evil which is avoided is evil which could only have been caused 
by the law itself” [41: 224]. However, it seems that Raz has to agree that it is impossible to imagine a 
system of law where none of the intuitive requirements of the rule of law were implemented, at least to 
a minimal extent (for plausible arguments on that behalf see Oberdiek and Patterson [34], Marmor [32] 
and Rijpkema [46]).
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6  Conclusion
In conclusion, we want to draw attention to the fact that traditional legal posi-
tivism, with its main thesis about the limits of law, appears to be the simplest 
articulation of a set of general platitudes about law—legal positivism as a theory 
of “obvious law” [3]. Legal positivism does not account for an “all-considered 
judgement”, but it has a certain epistemic virtue in that it allows us to determine 
law’s sources by specific assumed standards. As such, it is an “obvious” input, 
a conceptual premise, in any reasoning according to law or the application of 
law. However, if the outputs are counter-intuitive, Moore suggests that we should 
turn to morally determined theories, or moral reasons, to achieve an “all-things-
considered safety-valve judgment”. Thus, non-source-based reasons serve as a 
“safety-valve” in the system and as such they are also “admissible”.
Theories that argue for such a “safety-valve” simply stress and develop fur-
ther certain normative platitudes of the folk theory of law. This group of theories 
includes the “reflective” versions of legal positivism referred to above.
In any case of a discursive articulation of an idea of law, its interpretation, etc., 
there must be something to begin with. The truism of law’s limits is explained by 
legal positivism by means of the theory of a determining role of legal practice: 
traditional positivism with respect to the sources of law and institutional scaf-
folding: reflective positivism with respect to theoretical disagreements. Positivist 
theories are, however, quite minimalistic in those explanations. This minimalistic 
character is manifested in the claim that the rule of recognition reflects some kind 
of “common meaning” or “use” of the word ‘law’ [37: 316]. In their complicated 
practice, officials are simply eager to count something as law, and since law is 
mind-independent only in the weak sense most of them cannot be wrong in doing 
so. Such an attitude may be plausible from an historical point of view as many 
lawyers and officials believe that in the majority of legal cases, the answer to 
the question “what is law?” is not a difficult one. Thus, the general intuition that 
most cases are “easy cases” is reflected in the positivist theory—the theory of the 
“obvious law” [33: 446; cf. 15: 327].
One will, however, always remember that folk theory reflected in common 
institutional practices of both officials and lay people may be articulated in vari-
ous ways. Foundational folk theory, related to the general beliefs about rule of 
law, is a necessary reference point for a legal philosopher. Certain platitudes must 
be accepted by anyone who wants to theorise about law. Theoretical disagree-
ments arise due to underdetermination of theories by the same platitudes. Theo-
ries that ignore the foundational platitudes of law are not theories of law. They do 
not participate in a reasonable theoretical disagreement about law. They are the 
theories of a different objects.
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